3.6 .. . AND IN THE WHITE HOUSE
Because coping with terrorism was not (and is not) the sole province of any
component of the U.S. government, some coordinating mechanism is necessary. When
terrorism was not a prominent issue, the State Department could perform this
role. When the Iranian hostage crisis developed, this procedure went by the
board: National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski took charge of crisis
management.
The Reagan administration continued and formalized the practice of
having presidential staff coordinate counterterrorism. After the killing of the
marines in Beirut, President Reagan signed National Security Directive 138,
calling for a "shift . . . from passive to active defense measures"
and reprogramming or adding new resources to effect the shift. It directed the
State Department "to intensify efforts to achieve cooperation of other
governments" and the CIA to "intensify use of liaison and other
intelligence capabilities and also to develop plans and capability to preempt
groups and individuals planning strikes against U.S. interests."95
Speaking to the American Bar Association in July 1985, the President
characterized terrorism as "an act of war" and declared: "There
can be no place on earth left where it is safe for these monsters to rest, to
train, or practice their cruel and deadly skills. We must act together, or
unilaterally, if necessary to ensure that terrorists have no
sanctuary-anywhere."96 The air strikes against Libya were one
manifestation of this strategy.
Through most of President Reagan's second term, the coordination of
counterterrorism was overseen by a high-level interagency committee chaired by
the deputy national security adviser. But the Reagan administration closed with
a major scandal that cast a cloud over the notion that the White House should
guide counterterrorism.
President Reagan was concerned because Hezbollah was taking Americans hostage
and periodically killing them. He was also constrained by a bill he signed into
law that made it illegal to ship military aid to anticommunist Contra guerrillas
in Nicaragua, whom he strongly supported. His national security adviser, Robert
McFarlane, and McFarlane's deputy, Admiral John Poindexter, thought the hostage
problem might be solved and the U.S. position in the Middle East improved if the
United States quietly negotiated with Iran about exchanging hostages for modest
quantities of arms. Shultz and Weinberger, united for once, opposed McFarlane
and Poindexter.
A staffer for McFarlane and Poindexter, Marine Lieutenant Colonel Oliver
North, developed a scheme to trade U.S. arms for hostages and divert the
proceeds to the Contras to get around U.S. law. He may have had encouragement
from Director of Central Intelligence William Casey.97
When the facts were revealed in 1986 and 1987, it appeared to be the 1970s
all over again: a massive abuse of covert action. Now, instead of stories about
poisoned cigars and Mafia hit men, Americans heard testimony about a secret
visit to Tehran by McFarlane, using an assumed name and bearing a chocolate cake
decorated with icing depicting a key. An investigation by a special counsel
resulted in the indictment of McFarlane, Poindexter, North, and ten others,
including several high-ranking officers from the CIA's Clandestine Service. The
investigations spotlighted the importance of accountability and official
responsibility for faithful execution of laws. For the story of 9/11, the
significance of the Iran-Contra affair was that it made parts of the bureaucracy
reflexively skeptical about any operating directive from the White House.98
As the national security advisor's function expanded, the procedures and
structure of the advisor's staff, conventionally called the National Security
Council staff, became more formal. The advisor developed recommendations for
presidential directives, differently labeled by each president. For President
Clinton, they were to be Presidential Decision Directives; for President George
W. Bush, National Security Policy Directives. These documents and many others
requiring approval by the president worked their way through interagency
committees usually composed of departmental representatives at the assistant
secretary level or just below it. The NSC staff had senior directors who would
sit on these interagency committees, often as chair, to facilitate agreement and
to represent the wider interests of the national security advisor.