After the millennium alert, elements of the U.S. government reviewed their
performance. The CIA's leadership was told that while a number of plots had been
disrupted, the millennium might be only the "kick-off" for a period of
extended attacks.55 Clarke wrote Berger on January 11, 2000,
that the CIA, the FBI, Justice, and the NSC staff had come to two main
conclusions. First, U.S. disruption efforts thus far had "not put too much
of a dent" in Bin Ladin's network. If the United States wanted to
"roll back" the threat, disruption would have to proceed at "a
markedly different tempo." Second, "sleeper cells" and "a
variety of terrorist groups" had turned up at home.56 As one of
Clarke's staff noted, only a "chance discovery" by U.S. Customs had
prevented a possible attack.57 Berger gave his approval for the NSC
staff to commence an "afteraction review," anticipating new budget
requests. He also asked DCI Tenet to review the CIA's counterterrorism strategy
and come up with a plan for "where we go from here."58
The NSC staff advised Berger that the United States had only been
"nibbling at the edges" of Bin Ladin's network and that more terror
attacks were a question not of "if" but rather of "when" and
"where."59 The Principals Committee met on March 10, 2000,
to review possible new moves. The principals ended up agreeing that the
government should take three major steps. First, more money should go to the CIA
to accelerate its efforts to "seriously attrit" al Qaeda. Second,
there should be a crackdown on foreign terrorist organizations in the United
States. Third, immigration law enforcement should be strengthened, and the INS
should tighten controls on the Canadian border (including stepping up
U.S.-Canada cooperation).The principals endorsed the proposed programs; some,
like expanding the number of Joint Terrorism Task Forces, moved forward, and
others, like creating a centralized translation unit for domestic intelligence
intercepts in Arabic and other languages, did not.60
Pressing Pakistan
While this process moved along, diplomacy continued its rounds. Direct pressure
on the Taliban had proved unsuccessful. As one NSC staff note put it,
"Under the Taliban, Afghanistan is not so much a state sponsor of terrorism
as it is a state sponsored by terrorists."61 In early 2000, the
United States began a high-level effort to persuade Pakistan to use its
influence over the Taliban.
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the
State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with
General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a
presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. Such a visit
was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy. He
told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin
Ladin. They left, however, reporting to Washington that Pakistan was unlikely in
fact to do anything, "given what it sees as the benefits of Taliban control
of Afghanistan."62
President Clinton was scheduled to travel to India. The State Department felt
that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan. The Secret
Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting
Pakistan would risk the President's life. Counterterrorism officials also argued
that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit. But President
Clinton insisted on including Pakistan in the itinerary for his trip to South
Asia.63 His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a
U.S. president had been there since 1969. At his meeting with Musharraf and
others, President Clinton concentrated on tensions between Pakistan and India
and the dangers of nuclear proliferation, but also discussed Bin Ladin.
President Clinton told us that when he pulled Musharraf aside for a brief,
one-on-one meeting, he pleaded with the general for help regarding Bin Ladin.
"I offered him the moon when I went to see him, in terms of better
relations with the United States, if he'd help us get Bin Ladin and deal with
another issue or two."64
The U.S. effort continued. Early in May, President Clinton urged Musharraf to
carry through on his promise to visit Afghanistan and press Mullah Omar to expel
Bin Ladin.65 At the end of the month, Under Secretary of State Thomas
Pickering followed up with a trip to the region.66 In June, DCI Tenet
traveled to Pakistan with the same general message.67 By September,
the United States was becoming openly critical of Pakistan for supporting a
Taliban military offensive aimed at completing the conquest of Afghanistan.68
In December, taking a step proposed by the State Department some months
earlier, the United States led a campaign for new UN sanctions, which resulted
in UN Security Council Resolution 1333, again calling for Bin Ladin's expulsion
and forbidding any country to provide the Taliban with arms or military
assistance.69 This, too, had little if any effect. The Taliban did
not expel Bin Ladin. Pakistani arms continued to flow across the border.
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright told us, "We did not have a strong
hand to play with the Pakistanis. Because of the sanctions required by U.S. law,
we had few carrots to offer."70 Congress had blocked most
economic and military aid to Pakistan because of that country's nuclear arms
program and Musharraf's coup. Sheehan was critical of Musharraf, telling us that
the Pakistani leader "blew a chance to remake Pakistan."71
