The Bush administration in its first months faced many problems other than
terrorism. They included the collapse of the Middle East peace process and, in
April, a crisis over a U.S. "spy plane" brought down in Chinese
territory. The new administration also focused heavily on Russia, a new nuclear
strategy that allowed missile defenses, Europe, Mexico, and the Persian Gulf.
In the spring, reporting on terrorism surged dramatically. In chapter 8, we
will explore this reporting and the ways agencies responded. These increasingly
alarming reports, briefed to the President and top officials, became part of the
context in which the new administration weighed its options for policy on al
Qaeda.
Except for a few reports that the CSG considered and apparently judged to be
unreliable, none of these pointed specifically to possible al Qaeda action
inside the United States-although the CSG continued to be concerned about the
domestic threat. The mosaic of threat intelligence came from the
Counterterrorist Center, which collected only abroad. Its reports were not
supplemented by reports from the FBI. Clarke had expressed concern about an al
Qaeda presence in the United States, and he worried about an attack on the White
House by "Hizbollah, Hamas, al Qida and other terrorist
organizations."194
In May, President Bush announced that Vice President Cheney would himself
lead an effort looking at preparations for managing a possible attack by weapons
of mass destruction and at more general problems of national pre-paredness. The
next few months were mainly spent organizing the effort and bringing an admiral
from the Sixth Fleet back to Washington to manage it. The Vice President's task
force was just getting under way when the 9/11 attack occurred.195
On May 29, at Tenet's request, Rice and Tenet converted their usual weekly
meeting into a broader discussion on al Qaeda; participants included Clarke, CTC
chief Cofer Black, and "Richard," a group chief with authority over
the Bin Ladin unit. Rice asked about "taking the offensive" and
whether any approach could be made to influence Bin Ladin or the Taliban. Clarke
and Black replied that the CIA's ongoing disruption activities were
"taking the offensive" and that Bin Ladin could not be deterred. A
wide-ranging discussion then ensued about "breaking the back" of Bin
Ladin's organization.196
Tenet emphasized the ambitious plans for covert action that the CIA had
developed in December 2000. In discussing the draft authorities for this program
in March, CIA officials had pointed out that the spending level envisioned for
these plans was larger than the CIA's entire current budget for counterterrorism
covert action. It would be a multiyear program, requiring such levels of
spending for about five years.197
The CIA official, "Richard," told us that Rice "got it."
He said she agreed with his conclusions about what needed to be done, although
he complained to us that the policy process did not follow through quickly
enough.198 Clarke and Black were asked to develop a range of options
for attacking Bin Ladin's organization, from the least to most ambitious.199
Rice and Hadley asked Clarke and his staff to draw up the new presidential
directive. On June 7, Hadley circulated the first draft, describing it as
"an admittedly ambitious" program for confronting al Qaeda.200
The draft NSPD's goal was to "eliminate the al Qida network of terrorist
groups as a threat to the United States and to friendly governments." It
called for a multiyear effort involving diplomacy, covert action, economic
measures, law enforcement, public diplomacy, and if necessary military efforts.
The State Department was to work with other governments to end all al Qaeda
sanctuaries, and also to work with the Treasury Department to disrupt terrorist
financing. The CIA was to develop an expanded covert action program including
significant additional funding and aid to anti-Taliban groups. The draft also
tasked OMB with ensuring that sufficient funds to support this program were
found in U.S. budgets from fiscal years 2002 to 2006.201
Rice viewed this draft directive as the embodiment of a comprehensive new
strategy employing all instruments of national power to eliminate the al Qaeda
threat. Clarke, however, regarded the new draft as essentially similar to the
proposal he had developed in December 2000 and put forward to the new
administration in January 2001.202 In May or June, Clarke asked to be
moved from his counterterrorism portfolio to a new set of responsibilities for
cybersecurity. He told us that he was frustrated with his role and with an
administration that he considered not "serious about al Qaeda."203
If Clarke was frustrated, he never expressed it to her, Rice told us.204
