Looking for Other Options
The Counterterrorist Center continued to track Bin Ladin and to contemplate
covert action. The most hopeful possibility seemed now to lie in diplomacy- but
not diplomacy managed by the Department of State, which focused primarily on
India-Pakistan nuclear tensions during the summer of 1998.The CIA learned in the
spring of 1998 that the Saudi government had quietly disrupted Bin Ladin cells
in its country that were planning to attack U.S. forces with shoulder-fired
missiles. They had arrested scores of individuals, with no publicity. When
thanking the Saudis, Director Tenet took advantage of the opening to ask them to
help against Bin Ladin. The response was encouraging enough that President
Clinton made Tenet his informal personal representative to work with the Saudis
on terrorism, and Tenet visited Riyadh in May and again in early June.
33
Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah, who had taken charge from the ailing King Fahd,
promised Tenet an all-out secret effort to persuade the Taliban to expel Bin
Ladin so that he could be sent to the United States or to another country for
trial. The Kingdom's emissary would be its intelligence chief, Prince Turki bin
Faisal. Vice President Al Gore later added his thanks to those of Tenet, both
making clear that they spoke with President Clinton's blessing. Tenet reported
that it was imperative to get an indictment against Bin Ladin. The New York
grand jury issued its sealed indictment a few days later, on June 10.Tenet also
recommended that no action be taken on other U.S. options, such as the covert
action plan.34
Prince Turki followed up in meetings during the summer with Mullah Omar and
other Taliban leaders. Apparently employing a mixture of possible incentives and
threats, Turki received a commitment that Bin Ladin would be expelled, but
Mullah Omar did not make good on this promise.35
On August 5, Clarke chaired a CSG meeting on Bin Ladin. In the discussion of
what might be done, the note taker wrote, "there was a dearth of bright
ideas around the table, despite a consensus that the [government] ought to
pursue every avenue it can to address the problem."36
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