A Follow-On Campaign?
Clarke hoped the August 1998 missile strikes would mark the beginning of a
sustained campaign against Bin Ladin. Clarke was, as he later admitted,
"obsessed" with Bin Ladin, and the embassy bombings gave him new scope
for pursuing his obsession. Terrorism had moved high up among the President's
concerns, and Clarke's position had elevated accordingly. The CSG, unlike most
standing interagency committees, did not have to report through the Deputies
Committee. Although such a reporting relationship had been prescribed in the May
1998 presidential directive (after expressions of concern by Attorney General
Reno, among others), that directive contained an exception that permitted the
CSG to report directly to the principals if Berger so elected. In practice, the
CSG often reported not even to the full Principals Committee but instead to the
so-called Small Group formed by Berger, consisting only of those principals
cleared to know about the most sensitive issues connected with counterterrorism
activities concerning Bin Ladin or the Khobar Towers investigation.
56
For this inner cabinet, Clarke drew up what he called
"Political-Military Plan Delenda." The Latin delenda, meaning
that something "must be destroyed," evoked the famous Roman vow to
destroy its rival, Carthage.The overall goal of Clarke's paper was to
"immediately eliminate any significant threat to Americans" from the
"Bin Ladin network."57The paper called for diplomacy to
deny Bin Ladin sanctuary; covert action to disrupt terrorist activities, but
above all to capture Bin Ladin and his deputies and bring them to trial; efforts
to dry up Bin Ladin's money supply; and preparation for follow-on military
action. The status of the document was and remained uncertain. It was never
formally adopted by the principals, and participants in the Small Group now have
little or no recollection of it. It did, however, guide Clarke's efforts.
The military component of Clarke's plan was its most fully articulated
element. He envisioned an ongoing campaign of strikes against Bin Ladin's bases
in Afghanistan or elsewhere, whenever target information was ripe. Acknowledging
that individual targets might not have much value, he cautioned Berger not to
expect ever again to have an assembly of terrorist leaders in his sights. But he
argued that rolling attacks might persuade the Taliban to hand over Bin Ladin
and, in any case, would show that the action in August was not a
"one-off" event. It would show that the United States was committed to
a relentless effort to take down Bin Ladin's network.58
Members of the Small Group found themselves unpersuaded of the merits of
rolling attacks. Defense Secretary William Cohen told us Bin Ladin's training
camps were primitive, built with "rope ladders"; General Shelton
called them "jungle gym" camps. Neither thought them worthwhile
targets for very expensive missiles. President Clinton and Berger also worried
about the Economist's point-that attacks that missed Bin Ladin could
enhance his stature and win him new recruits. After the United States launched
air attacks against Iraq at the end of 1998 and against Serbia in 1999, in each
case provoking worldwide criticism, Deputy National Security Advisor James
Steinberg added the argument that attacks in Afghanistan offered "little
benefit, lots of blowback against [a] bomb-happy U.S."59
During the last week of August 1998, officials began considering possible
follow-on strikes. According to Clarke, President Clinton was inclined to launch
further strikes sooner rather than later. On August 27, Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy Walter Slocombe advised Secretary Cohen that the available
targets were not promising. The experience of the previous week, he wrote,
"has only confirmed the importance of defining a clearly articulated
rationale for military action" that was effective as well as justified. But
Slocombe worried that simply striking some of these available targets did not
add up to an effective strategy.60
Defense officials at a lower level, in the Office of the Assistant Secretary
for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, tried to meet Slocombe's
objections. They developed a plan that, unlike Clarke's, called not for
particular strikes but instead for a broad change in national strategy and in
the institutional approach of the Department of Defense, implying a possible
need for large-scale operations across the whole spectrum of U.S. military
capabilities. It urged the department to become a lead agency in driving a
national counterterrorism strategy forward, to "champion a national effort
to take up the gauntlet that international terrorists have thrown at our
feet." The authors expressed concern that "we have not fundamentally
altered our philosophy or our approach" even though the terrorist threat
had grown. They outlined an eight-part strategy "to be more proactive and
aggressive." The future, they warned, might bring "horrific
attacks," in which case "we will have no choice nor, unfortunately,
will we have a plan." The assistant secretary, Allen Holmes, took the paper
to Slocombe's chief deputy, Jan Lodal, but it went no further. Its lead author
recalls being told by Holmes that Lodal thought it was too aggressive. Holmes
cannot recall what was said, and Lodal cannot remember the episode or the paper
at all.61
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