The most likely explanation for the two generals' differing recollections is
that both of them thought serious preparation for any such operations would
require a long-term redeployment of Special Operations forces to the Middle East
or South Asia. The AC-130s would need bases because the aircraft's unrefueled
range was only a little over 2,000 miles. They needed search-and-rescue backup,
which would have still less range. Thus an AC-130 deployment had to be embedded
in a wider political and military concept involving Pakistan or other
neighboring countries to address issues relating to basing and overflight. No
one ever put such an initiative on the table. Zinni therefore cautioned about
simply ordering up AC-130 deployments for a quick strike; Schoomaker planned for
what he saw as a practical strike option; and the underlying issues were not
fully engaged. The Joint Staff decision paper was never turned into an
interagency policy paper.
The same was true for the option of using ground units from the Special
Operations Command. Within the command, some officers-such as Schoomaker-wanted
the mission of "putting boots on the ground" to get at Bin Ladin and
al Qaeda. At the time, Special Operations was designated as a "supporting
command," not a "supported command": that is, it supported a
theater commander and did not prepare its own plans for dealing with al Qaeda.
Schoomaker proposed to Shelton and Cohen that Special Operations become a
supported command, but the proposal was not adopted. Had it been accepted, he
says, he would have taken on the al Qaeda mission instead of deferring to Zinni.
Lieutenant General William Boykin, the current deputy under secretary of defense
for intelligence and a founding member of Delta Force, told us that
"opportunities were missed because of an unwillingness to take risks and a
lack of vision and understanding."143
President Clinton relied on the advice of General Shelton, who informed him
that without intelligence on Bin Ladin's location, a commando raid's chance of
failure was high. Shelton told President Clinton he would go forward with
"boots on the ground" if the President ordered him to do so; however,
he had to ensure that the President was completely aware of the large logistical
problems inherent in a military operation.144
The Special Operations plans were apparently conceived as another quick
strike option-an option to insert forces after the United States received
actionable intelligence. President Clinton told the Commission that "if we
had had really good intelligence about . . . where [Usama Bin Ladin] was, I
would have done it." Zinni and Schoomaker did make preparations for
possible very high risk in-and-out operations to capture or kill terrorists.
Cohen told the Commission that the notion of putting military personnel on the
ground without some reasonable certitude that Bin Ladin was in a particular
location would have resulted in the mission's failure and the loss of life in a
fruitless effort.145 None of these officials was aware of the
ambitious plan developed months earlier by lower-level Defense officials.
