In our Interviews
In our interviews, some military officers repeatedly invoked the analogy of
Desert One and the failed 1980 hostage rescue mission in Iran.146
They were dubious about a quick strike approach to using Special Operations
Forces, which they thought complicated and risky. Such efforts would have
required bases in the region, but all the options were unappealing. Pro-Taliban
elements of Pakistan's military might warn Bin Ladin or his associates of
pending operations. With nearby basing options limited, an alternative was to
fly from ships in the Arabian Sea or from land bases in the Persian Gulf, as was
done after 9/11. Such operations would then have to be supported from long
distances, overflying the airspace of nations that might not have been
supportive or aware of U.S. efforts.147
However, if these hurdles were addressed, and if the military could then
operate regularly in the region for a long period, perhaps clandestinely, it
might attempt to gather intelligence and wait for an opportunity. One Special
Operations commander said his view of actionable intelligence was that if you
"give me the action, I will give you the intelligence."148
But this course would still be risky, in light both of the difficulties already
mentioned and of the danger that U.S. operations might fail disastrously. We
have found no evidence that such a long-term political-military approach for
using Special Operations Forces in the region was proposed to or analyzed by the
Small Group, even though such capability had been honed for at least a decade
within the Defense Department.
Therefore the debate looked to some like bold proposals from civilians
meeting hypercaution from the military. Clarke saw it this way. Of the military,
he said to us, "They were very, very, very reluctant."149
But from another perspective, poorly informed proposals for bold action were
pitted against experienced professional judgment. That was how Secretary of
Defense Cohen viewed it. He said to us: "I would have to place my judgment
call in terms of, do I believe that the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, former
commander of Special Forces command, is in a better position to make a judgment
on the feasibility of this than, perhaps, Mr. Clarke?"150
Beyond a large-scale political-military commitment to build up a covert or
clandestine capability using American personnel on the ground, either military
or CIA, there was a still larger option that could have been considered-invading
Afghanistan itself. Every official we questioned about the possibility of an
invasion of Afghanistan said that it was almost unthinkable, absent a
provocation such as 9/11, because of poor prospects for cooperation from
Pakistan and other nations and because they believed the public would not
support it. Cruise missiles were and would remain the only military option on
the table.
