With a new operational strategy, the CIA evaluated its capture options. None
scored high marks. The CIA had no confidence in the Pakistani effort. In the
event that Bin Ladin traveled to the Kandahar region in southern Afghanistan,
the tribal network there was unlikely to attack a heavily guarded Bin Ladin; the
Counterterrorist Center rated the chance of success at less than 10 percent. To
the northwest, the Uzbeks might be ready for a cross-border sortie in six
months; their chance of success was also rated at less than 10 percent.192
In the northeast were Massoud's Northern Alliance forces-perhaps the CIA's
best option. In late October, a group of officers from the Counterterrorist
Center flew into the Panjshir Valley to meet up with Massoud, a hazardous
journey in rickety helicopters that would be repeated several times in the
future. Massoud appeared committed to helping the United States collect
intelligence on Bin Ladin's activities and whereabouts and agreed to try to
capture him if the opportunity arose. The Bin Ladin unit was satisfied that its
reporting on Bin Ladin would now have a second source. But it also knew that
Massoud would act against Bin Ladin only if his own interests and those of the
United States intersected. By early December, the CIA rated this possibility at
less than 15 percent.193
Finally, the CIA considered the possibility of putting U.S. personnel on the
ground in Afghanistan. The CIA had been discussing this option with Special
Operations Command and found enthusiasm on the working level but reluctance at
higher levels. CIA saw a 95 percent chance of Special Operations Command forces
capturing Bin Ladin if deployed-but less than a 5 percent chance of such a
deployment. Sending CIA officers into Afghanistan was to be considered "if
the gain clearly outweighs the risk"-but at this time no such
gains presented themselves to warrant the risk.194
As mentioned earlier, such a protracted deployment of U.S. Special Operations
Forces into Afghanistan, perhaps as part of a team joined to a deployment of the
CIA's own officers, would have required a major policy initiative (probably
combined with efforts to secure the support of at least one or two neighboring
countries) to make a long-term commitment, establish a durable presence on the
ground, and be prepared to accept the associated risks and costs. Such a
military plan was never developed for interagency consideration before 9/11.As
1999 came to a close, the CIA had a new strategic plan in place for capturing
Bin Ladin, but no option was rated as having more than a 15 percent chance of
achieving that objective.
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