Terrorist Financing
The second major point on which the principals had agreed on March 10 was the
need to crack down on terrorist organizations and curtail their fund-raising.
The embassy bombings of 1998 had focused attention on al Qaeda's finances.
One result had been the creation of an NSC-led interagency committee on
terrorist financing. On its recommendation, the President had designated Bin
Ladin and al Qaeda as subject to sanctions under the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act. This gave the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign
Assets Control (OFAC) the ability to search for and freeze any Bin Ladin or al
Qaeda assets that reached the U.S. financial system. But since OFAC had little
information to go on, few funds were frozen.79
In July 1999, the President applied the same designation to the Taliban for
harboring Bin Ladin. Here, OFAC had more success. It blocked more than $34
million in Taliban assets held in U.S. banks. Another $215 million in gold and
$2 million in demand deposits, all belonging to the Afghan central bank and held
by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, were also frozen.80After
October 1999, when the State Department formally designated al Qaeda a
"foreign terrorist organization," it became the duty of U.S. banks to
block its transactions and seize its funds.81 Neither this
designation nor UN sanctions had much additional practical effect; the sanctions
were easily circumvented, and there were no multilateral mechanisms to ensure
that other countries' financial systems were not used as conduits for terrorist
funding.82
Attacking the funds of an institution, even the Taliban, was easier than
finding and seizing the funds of a clandestine worldwide organization like al
Qaeda. Although the CIA's Bin Ladin unit had originally been inspired by the
idea of studying terrorist financial links, few personnel assigned to it had any
experience in financial investigations. Any terrorist-financing intelligence
appeared to have been collected collaterally, as a consequence of gathering
other intelligence. This attitude may have stemmed in large part from the chief
of this unit, who did not believe that simply following the money from point A
to point B revealed much about the terrorists' plans and intentions. As a
result, the CIA placed little emphasis on terrorist financing.83
Nevertheless, the CIA obtained a general understanding of how al Qaeda raised
money. It knew relatively early, for example, about the loose affiliation of
financial institutions, businesses, and wealthy individuals who supported
extremist Islamic activities.84 Much of the early reporting on al
Qaeda's financial situation and its structure came from Jamal Ahmed al Fadl,
whom we have mentioned earlier in the report.85 After the 1998
embassy bombings, the U.S. government tried to develop a clearer picture of Bin
Ladin's finances. A U.S. interagency group traveled to Saudi Arabia twice, in
1999 and 2000, to get information from the Saudis about their understanding of
those finances. The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion
that Bin Ladin was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not
true.
