The officials developed a new theory: al Qaeda was getting its money
elsewhere, and the United States needed to focus on other sources of funding,
such as charities, wealthy donors, and financial facilitators. Ultimately,
although the intelligence community devoted more resources to the issue and
produced somewhat more intelligence,86 it remained difficult to
distinguish al Qaeda's financial transactions among the vast sums moving in the
international financial system. The CIA was not able to find or disrupt al
Qaeda's money flows.87
The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the
intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing
intelligence analysis center. Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at
Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources.88
Within the United States, various FBI field offices gathered intelligence on
organizations suspected of raising funds for al Qaeda or other terrorist groups.
By 9/11, FBI agents understood that there were extremist organizations operating
within the United States supporting a global jihadist movement and with
substantial connections to al Qaeda. The FBI operated a web of informants,
conducted electronic surveillance, and had opened significant investigations in
a number of field offices, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, San Diego, and
Minneapolis. On a national level, however, the FBI never used the information to
gain a systematic or strategic understanding of the nature and extent of al
Qaeda fundraising.89
Treasury regulators, as well as U.S. financial institutions, were generally
focused on finding and deterring or disrupting the vast flows of U.S. currency
generated by drug trafficking and high-level international fraud. Large-scale
scandals, such as the use of the Bank of New York by Russian money launderers to
move millions of dollars out of Russia, captured the attention of the Department
of the Treasury and of Congress.90 Before 9/11,Treasury did not
consider terrorist financing important enough to mention in its national
strategy for money laundering.91
