At some point during this period, President Clinton expressed his frustration
with the lack of military options to take out Bin Ladin and the al Qaeda
leadership, remarking to General Hugh Shelton, "You know, it would scare
the shit out of al-Qaeda if suddenly a bunch of black ninjas rappelled out of
helicopters into the middle of their camp."109 Although Shelton
told the Commission he did not remember the statement, President Clinton
recalled this remark as "one of the many things I said." The President
added, however, that he realized nothing would be accomplished if he lashed out
in anger. Secretary of Defense William Cohen thought that the President might
have been making a hypothetical statement. Regardless, he said, the question
remained how to get the "ninjas" into and out of the theater of
operations.110 As discussed in chapter 4, plans of this kind were
never carried out before 9/11.
In late 1999 or early 2000, the Joint Staff's director of operations, Vice
Admiral Scott Fry, directed his chief information operations officer, Brigadier
General Scott Gration, to develop innovative ways to get better intelligence on
Bin Ladin's whereabouts. Gration and his team worked on a number of different
ideas aimed at getting reliable American eyes on Bin Ladin in a way that would
reduce the lag time between sighting and striking.111
One option was to use a small, unmanned U.S. Air Force drone called
the Predator, which could survey the territory below and send back video
footage. Another option-eventually dismissed as impractical-was to place a
powerful long-range telescope on a mountain within range of one of Bin Ladin's
training camps. Both proposals were discussed with General Shelton, the chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and then briefed to Clarke's office at the White
House as the CSG was searching for new ideas. In the spring of 2000, Clarke
brought in the CIA's assistant director for collection, Charles Allen, to work
together with Fry on a joint CIA-Pentagon effort that Clarke dubbed "Afghan
Eyes."112After much argument between the CIA and the Defense
Department about who should pay for the program, the White House eventually
imposed a cost-sharing agreement. The CIA agreed to pay for Predator operations
as a 60-day "proof of concept" trial run.113
The Small Group backed Afghan Eyes at the end of June 2000. By mid-July,
testing was completed and the equipment was ready, but legal issues were still
being ironed out.114 By August 11, the principals had agreed to
deploy the Predator.115 The NSC staff considered how to use the
information the drones would be relaying from Afghanistan. Clarke's deputy,
Roger Cressey, wrote to Berger that emergency CSG and Principals Committee
meetings might be needed to act on video coming in from the Predator if it
proved able to lock in Bin Ladin's location. In the memo's margin, Berger wrote
that before considering action, "I will want more than verified location:
we will need, at least, data on pattern of movements to provide some assurance
he will remain in place." President Clinton was kept up to date.116
On September 7, the Predator flew for the first time over Afghanistan. When
Clarke saw video taken during the trial flight, he described the imagery to
Berger as "truly astonishing," and he argued immediately for more
flights seeking to find Bin Ladin and target him for cruise missile or air
attack. Even if Bin Ladin were not found, Clarke said, Predator missions might
identify additional worthwhile targets, such as other al Qaeda leaders or stocks
of chemical or biological weapons.117
Clarke was not alone in his enthusiasm. He had backing from Cofer Black and
Charles Allen at the CIA. Ten out of 15 trial missions of the Predator over
Afghanistan were rated successful. On the first flight, a Predator saw a
security detail around a tall man in a white robe at Bin Ladin's Tarnak Farms
compound outside Kandahar. After a second sighting of the "man in
white" at the compound on September 28, intelligence community analysts
determined that he was probably Bin Ladin.118
During at least one trial mission, the Taliban spotted the Predator and
scrambled MiG fighters to try, without success, to intercept it. Berger worried
that a Predator might be shot down, and warned Clarke that a shootdown would be
a "bonanza" for Bin Ladin and the Taliban.119
Still, Clarke was optimistic about Predator-as well as progress with
disruptions of al Qaeda cells elsewhere. Berger was more cautious, praising the
NSC staff's performance but observing that this was no time for complacency.
"Unfortunately," he wrote, "the light at the end of the tunnel is
another tunnel."120
