While Nashiri was in Afghanistan, Nibras and Khamri saw their chance. They
piloted the explosives-laden boat alongside the USS Cole, made friendly
gestures to crew members, and detonated the bomb. Quso did not arrive at the
apartment in time to film the attack.124
Back in Afghanistan, Bin Ladin anticipated U.S. military retaliation. He
ordered the evacuation of al Qaeda's Kandahar airport compound and fled- first
to the desert area near Kabul, then to Khowst and Jalalabad, and eventually back
to Kandahar. In Kandahar, he rotated between five to six residences, spending
one night at each residence. In addition, he sent his senior advisor, Mohammed
Atef, to a different part of Kandahar and his deputy, Ayman al Zawahiri, to
Kabul so that all three could not be killed in one attack.125
There was no American strike. In February 2001, a source reported that an
individual whom he identified as the big instructor (probably a reference to Bin
Ladin) complained frequently that the United States had not yet attacked.
According to the source, Bin Ladin wanted the United States to attack, and if it
did not he would launch something bigger.126
The attack on the USS Cole galvanized al Qaeda's recruitment
efforts. Following the attack, Bin Ladin instructed the media committee, then
headed by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, to produce a propaganda video that included a
reenactment of the attack along with images of the al Qaeda training camps and
training methods; it also highlighted Muslim suffering in Palestine, Kashmir,
Indonesia, and Chechnya. Al Qaeda's image was very important to Bin Ladin, and
the video was widely disseminated. Portions were aired on Al Jazeera, CNN, and
other television outlets. It was also disseminated among many young men in Saudi
Arabia and Yemen, and caused many extremists to travel to Afghanistan for
training and jihad.Al Qaeda members considered the video an effective tool in
their struggle for preeminence among other Islamist and jihadist movements.127
