Spring 2001: Looking Again at Kuala Lumpur
By mid-May 2001, as the threat reports were surging, a CIA official detailed to
the International Terrorism Operations Section at the FBI wondered where the
attacks might occur. We will call him "John." Recalling the episode
about the Kuala Lumpur travel of Mihdhar and his associates, "John"
searched the CIA's databases for information regarding the travel. On May 15, he
and an official at the CIA reexamined many of the old cables from early 2000,
including the information that Mihdhar had a U.S. visa, and that Hazmi had come
to Los Angeles on January 15, 2000.63
The CIA official who reviewed the cables took no action regarding them.
"John," however, began a lengthy exchange with a CIA analyst, whom we
will call "Dave," to figure out what these cables meant.
"John" was aware of how dangerous Khallad was-at one point calling him
a "major league killer." He concluded that "something bad was
definitely up." Despite the U.S. links evident in this traffic,
"John" made no effort to determine whether any of these individuals
was in the United States. He did not raise that possibility with his FBI
counterpart. He was focused on Malaysia.64
"John" described the CIA as an agency that tended to play a
"zone defense." He was worrying solely about Southeast Asia, not the
United States. In contrast, he told us, the FBI tends to play
"man-to-man."65
Desk officers at the CIA's Bin Ladin unit did not have "cases" in
the same sense as an FBI agent who works an investigation from beginning to end.
Thus, when the trail went cold after the Kuala Lumpur meeting in January 2000,
the desk officer moved on to different things. By the time the March 2000 cable
arrived with information that one of the travelers had flown to Los Angeles, the
case officer was no longer responsible for follow-up. While several individuals
at the Bin Ladin unit opened the cable when it arrived in March 2000, no action
was taken.66
The CIA's zone defense concentrated on "where," not
"who." Had its information been shared with the FBI, a combination of
the CIA's zone defense and the FBI's man-to-man approach might have been
productive.
