Preparedness of First Responders
On 9/11, the principal first responders were from the Fire Department of New
York, the New York Police Department, the Port Authority Police Department (PAPD),
and the Mayor's Office of Emergency Management (OEM).
Port Authority Police Department. On September 11, 2001, the
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey Police Department consisted of 1,331
officers, many of whom were trained in fire suppression methods as well as in
law enforcement. The PAPD was led by a superintendent. There was a separate PAPD
command for each of the Port Authority's nine facilities, including the World
Trade Center.14
Most Port Authority police commands used ultra-high-frequency radios.
Although all the radios were capable of using more than one channel, most PAPD
officers used one local channel. The local channels were low-wattage and worked
only in the immediate vicinity of that command. The PAPD also had an agencywide
channel, but not all commands could access it.15
As of September 11, the Port Authority lacked any standard operating
procedures to govern how officers from multiple commands would respond to and
then be staged and utilized at a major incident at the WTC. In particular, there
were no standard operating procedures covering how different commands should
communicate via radio during such an incident.
The New York Police Department. The 40,000-officer NYPD was
headed by a police commissioner, whose duties were not primarily operational but
who retained operational authority. Much of the NYPD's operational activities
were run by the chief of department. In the event of a major emergency, a
leading role would be played by the Special Operations Division. This division
included the Aviation Unit, which provided helicopters for surveys and rescues,
and the Emergency Service Unit (ESU), which carried out specialized rescue
missions. The NYPD had specific and detailed standard operating procedures for
the dispatch of officers to an incident, depending on the incident's magnitude.16
The NYPD precincts were divided into 35 different radio zones, with a central
radio dispatcher assigned to each. In addition, there were several radio
channels for citywide operations. Officers had portable radios with 20 or more
available channels, so that the user could respond outside his or her precinct.
ESU teams also had these channels but at an operation would use a separate
point-to-point channel (which was not monitored by a dispatcher).17
The NYPD also supervised the city's 911 emergency call system. Its
approximately 1,200 operators, radio dispatchers, and supervisors were civilian
employees of the NYPD. They were trained in the rudiments of emergency response.
When a 911 call concerned a fire, it was transferred to FDNY dispatch.18
The Fire Department of New York. The 11,000-member FDNY was
headed by a fire commissioner who, unlike the police commissioner, lacked
operational authority. Operations were headed by the chief of department- the
sole five-star chief.19
The FDNY was organized in nine separate geographic divisions. Each division
was further divided into between four to seven battalions. Each battalion
contained typically between three and four engine companies and two to four
ladder companies. In total, the FDNY had 205 engine companies and 133 ladder
companies. On-duty ladder companies consisted of a captain or lieutenant and
five firefighters; on-duty engine companies consisted of a captain or lieutenant
and normally four firefighters. Ladder companies' primary function was to
conduct rescues; engine companies focused on extinguishing fires.20
The FDNY's Specialized Operations Command (SOC) contained a limited number of
units that were of particular importance in responding to a terrorist attack or
other major incident. The department's five rescue companies and seven squad
companies performed specialized and highly risky rescue operations.21
The logistics of fire operations were directed by Fire Dispatch Operations
Division, which had a center in each of the five boroughs. All 911 calls
concerning fire emergencies were transferred to FDNY dispatch.22
As of September 11, FDNY companies and chiefs responding to a fire used
analog, point-to-point radios that had six normal operating channels. Typically,
the companies would operate on the same tactical channel, which chiefs on the
scene would monitor and use to communicate with the firefighters. Chiefs at a
fire operation also would use a separate command channel. Because these
point-to-point radios had weak signal strength, communications on them could be
heard only by other FDNY personnel in the immediate vicinity. In addition, the
FDNY had a dispatch frequency for each of the five boroughs; these were not
point-to-point channels and could be monitored from around the city.23
The FDNY's radios performed poorly during the 1993 WTC bombing for two
reasons. First, the radios signals often did not succeed in penetrating the
numerous steel and concrete floors that separated companies attempting to
communicate; and second, so many different companies were attempting to use the
same point-to-point channel that communications became unintelligible.24
The Port Authority installed, at its own expense, a repeater system in 1994
to greatly enhance FDNY radio communications in the difficult high-rise
environment of the Twin Towers. The Port Authority recommended leaving the
repeater system on at all times. The FDNY requested, however, that the repeater
be turned on only when it was actually needed because the channel could cause
interference with other FDNY operations in Lower Manhattan. The repeater system
was installed at the Port Authority police desk in 5 WTC, to be activated by
members of the Port Authority police when the FDNY units responding to the WTC
complex so requested. However, in the spring of 2000 the FDNY asked that an
activation console for the repeater system be placed instead in the lobby fire
safety desk of each of the towers, making FDNY personnel entirely responsible
for its activation. The Port Authority complied.25
Between 1998 and 2000, fewer people died from fires in New York City than in
any three-year period since accurate measurements began in 1946.Fire-fighter
deaths-a total of 22 during the 1990s-compared favorably with the most tranquil
periods in the department's history.26
