Defining the Threat
In the post-9/11 world, threats are defined more by the fault lines within
societies than by the territorial boundaries between them. From terrorism to
global disease or environmental degradation, the challenges have become
transnational rather than international. That is the defining quality of world
politics in the twenty-first century.
National security used to be considered by studying foreign frontiers,
weighing opposing groups of states, and measuring industrial might. To be
dangerous, an enemy had to muster large armies. Threats emerged slowly, often
visibly, as weapons were forged, armies conscripted, and units trained and moved
into place. Because large states were more powerful, they also had more to lose.
They could be deterred.
Now threats can emerge quickly. An organization like al Qaeda, headquartered
in a country on the other side of the earth, in a region so poor that
electricity or telephones were scarce, could nonetheless scheme to wield weapons
of unprecedented destructive power in the largest cities of the United States.
In this sense, 9/11 has taught us that terrorism against American interests
"over there" should be regarded just as we regard terrorism against
America "over here." In this same sense, the American homeland is the
planet.
But the enemy is not just "terrorism," some generic evil.2
This vagueness blurs the strategy. The catastrophic threat at this moment in
history is more specific. It is the threat posed by Islamist
terrorism-especially the al Qaeda network, its affiliates, and its ideology.3
As we mentioned in chapter 2, Usama Bin Ladin and other Islamist terrorist
leaders draw on a long tradition of extreme intolerance within one stream of
Islam (a minority tradition), from at least Ibn Taimiyyah, through the founders
of Wahhabism, through the Muslim Brotherhood, to Sayyid Qutb. That stream is
motivated by religion and does not distinguish politics from religion, thus
distorting both. It is further fed by grievances stressed by Bin Ladin and
widely felt throughout the Muslim world-against the U.S. military presence in
the Middle East, policies perceived as anti-Arab and anti-Muslim, and support of
Israel. Bin Ladin and Islamist terrorists mean exactly what they say: to them
America is the font of all evil, the "head of the snake," and it must
be converted or destroyed.
It is not a position with which Americans can bargain or negotiate. With it
there is no common ground-not even respect for life-on which to begin a
dialogue. It can only be destroyed or utterly isolated.
Because the Muslim world has fallen behind the West politically,
economically, and militarily for the past three centuries, and because few
tolerant or secular Muslim democracies provide alternative models for the
future, Bin Ladin's message finds receptive ears. It has attracted active
support from thousands of disaffected young Muslims and resonates powerfully
with a far larger number who do not actively support his methods. The resentment
of America and the West is deep, even among leaders of relatively successful
Muslim states.4
Tolerance, the rule of law, political and economic openness, the extension of
greater opportunities to women-these cures must come from within Muslim
societies themselves. The United States must support such developments.
But this process is likely to be measured in decades, not years. It is a
process that will be violently opposed by Islamist terrorist organizations, both
inside Muslim countries and in attacks on the United States and other Western
nations. The United States finds itself caught up in a clash within a
civilization. That clash arises from particular conditions in the Muslim world,
conditions that spill over into expatriate Muslim communities in non-Muslim
countries.
Our enemy is twofold: al Qaeda, a stateless network of terrorists that struck
us on 9/11; and a radical ideological movement in the Islamic world, inspired in
part by al Qaeda, which has spawned terrorist groups and violence across the
globe. The first enemy is weakened, but continues to pose a grave threat. The
second enemy is gathering, and will menace Americans and American interests long
after Usama Bin Ladin and his cohorts are killed or captured. Thus our strategy
must match our means to two ends: dismantling the al Qaeda network and
prevailing in the longer term over the ideology that gives rise to Islamist
terrorism.
Islam is not the enemy. It is not synonymous with terror. Nor does Islam
teach terror. America and its friends oppose a perversion of Islam, not the
great world faith itself. Lives guided by religious faith, including literal
beliefs in holy scriptures, are common to every religion, and represent no
threat to us.
Other religions have experienced violent internal struggles. With so many
diverse adherents, every major religion will spawn violent zealots. Yet
understanding and tolerance among people of different faiths can and must
prevail.
The present transnational danger is Islamist terrorism. What is needed is a
broad political-military strategy that rests on a firm tripod of policies to
- attack terrorists and their organizations;
- prevent the continued growth of Islamist terrorism; and
- protect against and prepare for terrorist attacks.
