Afghanistan
Afghanistan was the incubator for al Qaeda and for the 9/11 attacks. In the fall
of 2001, the U.S.-led international coalition and its Afghan allies toppled the
Taliban and ended the regime's protection of al Qaeda. Notable progress has been
made. International cooperation has been strong, with a clear UN mandate and a
NATO-led peacekeeping force (the International Security Assistance Force, or
ISAF). More than 10,000 American soldiers are deployed today in Afghanistan,
joined by soldiers from NATO allies and Muslim states. A central government has
been established in Kabul, with a democratic constitution, new currency, and a
new army. Most Afghans enjoy greater freedom, women and girls are emerging from
subjugation, and 3 million children have returned to school. For the first time
in many years, Afghans have reason to hope.11
But grave challenges remain. Taliban and al Qaeda fighters have regrouped in
the south and southeast. Warlords control much of the country beyond Kabul, and
the land is awash in weapons. Economic development remains a distant hope. The
narcotics trade-long a massive sector of the Afghan economy- is again booming.
Even the most hardened aid workers refuse to operate in many regions, and some
warn that Afghanistan is near the brink of chaos.12
Battered Afghanistan has a chance. Elections are being prepared. It is
revealing that in June 2004, Taliban fighters resorted to slaughtering 16
Afghans on a bus, apparently for no reason other than their boldness in carrying
an unprecedented Afghan weapon: a voter registration card.
Afghanistan's president, Hamid Karzai, is brave and committed. He is trying
to build genuinely national institutions that can overcome the tradition of
allocating powers among ethnic communities. Yet even if his efforts are
successful and elections bring a democratic government to Afghanistan, the
United States faces some difficult choices.
After paying relatively little attention to rebuilding Afghanistan during the
military campaign, U.S. policies changed noticeably during 2003. Greater
consideration of the political dimension and congressional support for a
substantial package of assistance signaled a longer-term commitment to
Afghanistan's future. One Afghan regional official plaintively told us the
country finally has a good government. He begged the United States to keep its
promise and not abandon Afghanistan again, as it had in the 1990s.Another Afghan
leader noted that if the United States leaves, "we will lose all that we
have gained."13
Most difficult is to define the security mission in Afghanistan. There is
continuing political controversy about whether military operations in Iraq have
had any effect on the scale of America's commitment to the future of
Afghanistan. The United States has largely stayed out of the central
government's struggles with dissident warlords and it has largely avoided
confronting the related problem of narcotrafficking.14
Recommendation:The President and the Congress deserve praise for
their efforts in Afghanistan so far. Now the United States and the international
community should make a long-term commitment to a secure and stable Afghanistan,
in order to give the government a reasonable opportunity to improve the life of
the Afghan people. Afghanistan must not again become a sanctuary for
international crime and terrorism. The United States and the international
community should help the Afghan government extend its authority over the
country, with a strategy and nation-by-nation commitments to achieve their
objectives.
- This is an ambitious recommendation. It would mean a redoubled effort to
secure the country, disarm militias, and curtail the age of warlord rule.
But the United States and NATO have already committed themselves to the
future of this region-wisely, as the 9/11 story shows-and failed
half-measures could be worse than useless.
- NATO in particular has made Afghanistan a test of the Alliance's ability
to adapt to current security challenges of the future. NATO must pass this
test. Currently, the United States and the international community envision
enough support so that the central government can build a truly national
army and extend essential infrastructure and minimum public services to
major towns and regions. The effort relies in part on foreign civil-military
teams, arranged under various national flags. The institutional commitments
of NATO and the United Nations to these enterprises are weak. NATO member
states are not following through; some of the other states around the world
that have pledged assistance to Afghanistan are not fulfilling their
pledges.
- The U.S. presence in Afghanistan is overwhelmingly oriented toward
military and security work. The State Department presence is woefully
understaffed, and the military mission is narrowly focused on al Qaeda and
Taliban remnants in the south and southeast. The U.S. government can do its
part if the international community decides on a joint effort to restore the
rule of law and contain rampant crime and narcotics trafficking in this
crossroads of Central Asia.15
We heard again and again that the money for assistance is allocated so
rigidly that, on the ground, one U.S. agency often cannot improvise or pitch in
to help another agency, even in small ways when a few thousand dollars could
make a great difference.
The U.S. government should allocate money so that lower-level officials have
more flexibility to get the job done across agency lines, adjusting to the
circumstances they find in the field. This should include discretionary funds
for expenditures by military units that often encounter opportunities to help
the local population.
