Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia has been a problematic ally in combating Islamic extremism. At the
level of high policy, Saudi Arabia's leaders cooperated with American diplomatic
initiatives aimed at the Taliban or Pakistan before 9/11. At the same time,
Saudi Arabia's society was a place where al Qaeda raised money directly from
individuals and through charities. It was the society that produced 15 of the 19
hijackers.
The Kingdom is one of the world's most religiously conservative societies,
and its identity is closely bound to its religious links, especially its
position as the guardian of Islam's two holiest sites. Charitable giving, or zakat,
is one of the five pillars of Islam. It is broader and more pervasive than
Western ideas of charity- functioning also as a form of income tax, educational
assistance, foreign aid, and a source of political influence. The Western notion
of the separation of civic and religious duty does not exist in Islamic
cultures. Funding charitable works is an integral function of the governments in
the Islamic world. It is so ingrained in Islamic culture that in Saudi Arabia,
for example, a department within the Saudi Ministry of Finance and National
Economy collects zakat directly, much as the
U.S. Internal Revenue Service collects payroll withholding tax. Closely tied
to zakat is the dedication of the government to propagating the Islamic faith,
particularly the Wahhabi sect that flourishes in Saudi Arabia.
Traditionally, throughout the Muslim world, there is no formal oversight
mechanism for donations. As Saudi wealth increased, the amounts contributed by
individuals and the state grew dramatically. Substantial sums went to finance
Islamic charities of every kind.
While Saudi domestic charities are regulated by the Ministry of Labor and
Social Welfare, charities and international relief agencies, such as the World
Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY), are currently regulated by the Ministry of
Islamic Affairs. This ministry uses zakat and government funds to spread Wahhabi
beliefs throughout the world, including in mosques and schools. Often these
schools provide the only education available; even in affluent countries,
Saudi-funded Wahhabi schools are often the only Islamic schools. Some Wahhabi-funded
organizations have been exploited by extremists to further their goal of violent
jihad against non-Muslims. One such organization has been the al Haramain
Islamic Foundation; the assets of some branch offices have been frozen by the
U.S. and Saudi governments.
Until 9/11, few Saudis would have considered government oversight of
charitable donations necessary; many would have perceived it as interference in
the exercise of their faith. At the same time, the government's ability to
finance most state expenditures with energy revenues has delayed the need for a
modern income tax system. As a result, there have been strong religious,
cultural, and administrative barriers to monitoring charitable spending. That
appears to be changing, however, now that the goal of violent jihad also extends
to overthrowing Sunni governments (such as the House of Saud) that are not
living up to the ideals of the Islamist extremists.16
The leaders of the United States and the rulers of Saudi Arabia have long had
friendly relations, rooted in fundamentally common interests against the Soviet
Union during the Cold War, in American hopes that Saudi oil supplies would
stabilize the supply and price of oil in world markets, and in Saudi hopes that
America could help protect the Kingdom against foreign threats.
In 1990, the Kingdom hosted U.S. armed forces before the first U.S.-led war
against Iraq. American soldiers and airmen have given their lives to help
protect Saudi Arabia. The Saudi government has difficulty acknowledging this.
American military bases remained there until 2003, as part of an international
commitment to contain Iraq.
For many years, leaders on both sides preferred to keep their ties quiet and
behind the scenes. As a result, neither the U.S. nor the Saudi people
appreciated all the dimensions of the bilateral relationship, including the
Saudi role in
U.S. strategies to promote the Middle East peace process. In each country,
political figures find it difficult to publicly defend good relations with the
other.
Today, mutual recriminations flow. Many Americans see Saudi Arabia as an
enemy, not as an embattled ally. They perceive an autocratic government that
oppresses women, dominated by a wealthy and indolent elite. Saudi contacts with
American politicians are frequently invoked as accusations in partisan political
arguments. Americans are often appalled by the intolerance, anti-Semitism, and
anti-American arguments taught in schools and preached in mosques.
Saudis are angry too. Many educated Saudis who were sympathetic to America
now perceive the United States as an unfriendly state. One Saudi reformer noted
to us that the demonization of Saudi Arabia in the U.S. media gives ammunition
to radicals, who accuse reformers of being U.S. lackeys. Tens of thousands of
Saudis who once regularly traveled to (and often had homes in) the United States
now go elsewhere.17
Among Saudis, the United States is seen as aligned with Israel in its
conflict with the Palestinians, with whom Saudis ardently sympathize. Although
Saudi Arabia's cooperation against terrorism improved to some extent after the
September 11 attacks, significant problems remained. Many in the Kingdom
initially reacted with disbelief and denial. In the following months, as the
truth became clear, some leading Saudis quietly acknowledged the problem but
still did not see their own regime as threatened, and thus often did not respond
promptly to U.S. requests for help. Though Saddam Hussein was widely detested,
many Saudis are sympathetic to the anti-U.S. insurgents in Iraq, although
majorities also condemn jihadist attacks in the Kingdom.18
As in Pakistan, Yemen, and other countries, attitudes changed when the
terrorism came home. Cooperation had already become significant, but after the
bombings in Riyadh on May 12, 2003, it improved much more. The Kingdom openly
discussed the problem of radicalism, criticized the terrorists as religiously
deviant, reduced official support for religious activity overseas, closed
suspect charitable foundations, and publicized arrests-very public moves for a
government that has preferred to keep internal problems quiet.
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is now locked in mortal combat with al Qaeda.
Saudi police are regularly being killed in shootouts with terrorists. In June
2004, the Saudi ambassador to the United States called publicly-in the Saudi
press-for his government to wage a jihad of its own against the terrorists.
"We must all, as a state and as a people, recognize the truth about these
criminals," he declared,"[i]f we do not declare a general
mobilization-we will lose this war on terrorism."19
Saudi Arabia is a troubled country. Although regarded as very wealthy, in
fact per capita income has dropped from $28,000 at its height to the present
level of about $8,000. Social and religious traditions complicate adjustment to
modern economic activity and limit employment opportunities for young Saudis.
Women find their education and employment sharply limited.
President Clinton offered us a perceptive analysis of Saudi Arabia,
contending that fundamentally friendly rulers have been constrained by their
desire to preserve the status quo. He, like others, made the case for pragmatic
reform instead. He hopes the rulers will envision what they want their Kingdom
to become in 10 or 20 years, and start a process in which their friends can help
them change.20
There are signs that Saudi Arabia's royal family is trying to build a
consensus for political reform, though uncertain about how fast and how far to
go. Crown Prince Abdullah wants the Kingdom to join the World Trade Organization
to accelerate economic liberalization. He has embraced the Arab Human
Development Report, which was highly critical of the Arab world's
political, economic, and social failings and called for greater economic and
political reform.21
Cooperation with Saudi Arabia against Islamist terrorism is very much in the
U.S. interest. Such cooperation can exist for a time largely in secret, as it
does now, but it cannot grow and thrive there. Nor, on either side, can
friendship be unconditional.
Recommendation:The problems in the U.S.-Saudi relationship must be
confronted, openly. The United States and Saudi Arabia must determine if they
can build a relationship that political leaders on both sides are prepared to
publicly defend-a relationship about more than oil. It should include a shared
commitment to political and economic reform, as Saudis make common cause with
the outside world. It should include a shared interest in greater tolerance and
cultural respect, translating into a commitment to fight the violent extremists
who foment hatred.
