If it had happened on any other day, the disaster at the Pentagon would be
remembered as a singular challenge and an extraordinary national story. Yet the
calamity at the World Trade Center that same morning included catastrophic
damage 1,000 feet above the ground that instantly imperiled tens of thousands of
people. The two experiences are not comparable. Nonetheless, broader lessons in
integrating multiagency response efforts are apparent when we analyze the
response at the Pentagon.
The Twin Towers following the impact of American Airlines Flight 11 and
United Airlines Flight 175
The Pentagon, after being struck by American Airlines Flight 77
United Airlines Flight 93 crash site, Shanksville, Pennsylvania
The emergency response at the Pentagon represented a mix of local, state, and
federal jurisdictions and was generally effective. It overcame the inherent
complications of a response across jurisdictions because the Incident Command
System, a formalized management structure for emergency response, was in
place in the National Capital Region on 9/11.190
Because of the nature of the event-a plane crash, fire, and partial building
collapse-the Arlington County Fire Department served as incident
commander. Different agencies had different roles. The incident required a major
rescue, fire, and medical response from Arlington County at the U.S. military's
headquarters-a facility under the control of the secretary of defense. Since it
was a terrorist attack, the Department of Justice was the lead federal agency in
charge (with authority delegated to the FBI for operational response).
Additionally, the terrorist attack affected the daily operations and emergency
management requirements of Arlington County and all bordering and surrounding
jurisdictions.191
At 9:37, the west wall of the Pentagon was hit by hijacked American Airlines
Flight 77, a Boeing 757. The crash caused immediate and catastrophic damage. All
64 people aboard the airliner were killed, as were 125 people inside the
Pentagon (70 civilians and 55 military service members). One hundred six people
were seriously injured and transported to area hospitals.192
While no emergency response is flawless, the response to the 9/11 terrorist
attack on the Pentagon was mainly a success for three reasons: first, the strong
professional relationships and trust established among emergency responders;
second, the adoption of the Incident Command System; and third, the pursuit of a
regional approach to response. Many fire and police agencies that responded had
extensive prior experience working together on regional events and training
exercises. Indeed, at the time preparations were under way at many of these
agencies to ensure public safety at the annual meetings of the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank scheduled to be held later that month in
Washington, D.C.193
Local, regional, state, and federal agencies immediately responded to the
Pentagon attack. In addition to county fire, police, and sheriff's departments,
the response was assisted by the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority,
Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport Fire Department, Fort Myer Fire
Department, the Virginia State Police, the Virginia Department of Emergency
Management, the FBI, FEMA, a National Medical Response Team, the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, and numerous military personnel within the
Military District of Washington.194
Command was established at 9:41.At the same time, the Arlington County
Emergency Communications Center contacted the fire departments of Fairfax
County, Alexandria, and the District of Columbia to request mutual aid.
The incident command post provided a clear view of and access to the crash
site, allowing the incident commander to assess the situation at all times.195
At 9:55, the incident commander ordered an evacuation of the Pentagon impact
area because a partial collapse was imminent; it occurred at 9:57, and no first
responder was injured.196
At 10:15, the incident commander ordered a full evacuation of the command
post because of the warning of an approaching hijacked aircraft passed along by
the FBI. This was the first of three evacuations caused by reports of incoming
aircraft, and the evacuation order was well communicated and well coordinated.197
Several factors facilitated the response to this incident, and distinguish it
from the far more difficult task in New York. There was a single incident, and
it was not 1,000 feet above ground. The incident site was relatively easy to
secure and contain, and there were no other buildings in the immediate area.
There was no collateral damage beyond the Pentagon.198
Yet the Pentagon response encountered difficulties that echo those
experienced in New York. As the "Arlington County: After-Action
Report" notes, there were significant problems with both self-dispatching
and communications: "Organizations, response units, and individuals
proceeding on their own initiative directly to an incident site, without the
knowledge and permission of the host jurisdiction and the Incident Commander,
complicate the exercise of command, increase the risks faced by bonafide
responders, and exacerbate the challenge of accountability." With respect
to communications, the report concludes: "Almost all aspects of
communications continue to be problematic, from initial notification to tactical
operations. Cellular telephones were of little value.... Radio channels were
initially oversaturated.. . . Pagers seemed to be the most reliable means of
notification when available and used, but most firefighters are not issued
pagers."199
It is a fair inference, given the differing situations in New York City and
Northern Virginia, that the problems in command, control, and communications
that occurred at both sites will likely recur in any emergency of similar scale.
The task looking forward is to enable first responders to respond in a
coordinated manner with the greatest possible awareness of the situation.
